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 The purpose of this study is to examine teacher motivating factors in urban settings that 
influence their ability to go above and beyond the normal call or duty without concern for reward 
or merit.  The research defines these motivational factors within the context of the current school 
governance policy debate.  One side of the debate argues that teachers are motivated to 
demonstrate behaviors beyond their contractual agreement through monetary rewards, where 
teachers are paid incentives for performing noncompulsory tasks.  This practice is currently 
manifested in pay-for-performance practices.  The counter governing argument believes teachers 
are motivated through normative control where teachers collaborate together to develop common 
goals and norms.  These districts utilize professional learning communities as their normative 
model.  These two governing practices are framed theoretically by the control theories of market 
and clan control, respectively.  This study is significant because it closes the research gap 
between the debate of school governing practices and their effects on teacher altruistic behaviors.  
Specifically, the research answers the question:  Which control configuration best motivates 
teachers to demonstrate organizational citizenship behavior (OCB)? 
This study assessed motivating factors through a survey that looked at teacher perception 
of their colleagues to demonstrate behaviors that extend beyond the normal call of duty.  Two 
districts, one pay-for-performance and one professional learning community district, participated 
in this small sample study.  Teachers in the pay-for-performance district could earn up to ten 
thousand dollars each in bonus pay. Unlike many other models of pay-for-performance 
programs, where teachers compete against each other and are rewarded for outperforming their 
colleagues, this district utilized a federal grant that removed the competition among coworkers.  
Each teacher could earn the same amount of reward by performing specifically defined tasks that 
extended beyond their contractual agreement. Conversely, the professional learning community 
district scheduled regular time each week for teachers to collaborate on student behavior, data, 
upcoming lessons and objectives, and school goals. Here, teachers were motivated through 
school norms and collegial accountability to collectively reach the school’s desired outcomes.  
A total of 223 teachers participated in the online survey, answering five-point Likert scale 
questions on the two constructs within the study, altruistic behaviors, or OCB, and teacher 
collaboration. Within the survey, participants responded to twenty-two OCB questions that 
stemmed from previously developed surveys that incorporated the five characteristics that define 
citizenship – altruism, conscientiousness, sportsmanship, civic virtue, and courtesy.  All 
respondents also answered questions regarding teacher attitudes towards professional learning 
communities. These fifteen questions stemmed from previously developed surveys on the PLC 
concept.  In essence, the survey assessed teacher motivation to perform the dependent variable of 
citizenship behavior, or altruistic acts.   
The findings of this study confirmed its hypothesis.  Teachers within the professional 
learning community district believed that their colleagues manifested altruistic behaviors at .370 
units more than the average pay-for-performance teachers assessed the altruistic levels of their 
colleagues.  In simple terms, this basically means that teachers in professional learning 
communities exhibit more altruistic behaviors than their counterparts in pay-for-performance 
communities. This concludes that teachers are motivated through normative controls to perform 
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1.1 Statement of Problem: Urban Schools’ Need For Citizenship Behavior   
Since the first draft of A Nation at Risk in 1983, school reform has been a continuous 
debate.  The United States has identified itself educationally behind other leading countries in the 
world.  Moreover, within our own country, urban education has received constant criticism of 
failing to meet academic standards and falling short of suburban counterparts.  The urban school 
issues of student population and the innate obstacles of hiring qualified personnel lay the 
fundamental argument of the importance of this study.   
Student populations in urban schools tend to be described in terms of two basic statistics: 
percentage minority and percentage low income (Bryk et al., 2010).  Low income students are 
defined as those that qualify for the federal free and reduced lunch program.  Crosby (1999) 
defines the urban school population as the following, [the urban] population consists largely of 
minorities: immigrants, African Americans, and the poor.  Based on this student population, 
urban schools are much more than simple academic organizations.  They have become social and 
welfare institutions that provide a safe environment for student and family recreation, and health 
care, food and employment services.  These services define a greater need in urban settings than 
in other schools. 
With the complex, and sometimes competing, ingredients that make up the urban 
settings, it is important to understand how to motivate teachers to perform behaviors for the good 
of their organizations. It is puzzling to think that since urban schools are in need of teachers that 
will do more than officially expected of them, there is little known about the motivating factors of 
teachers to do so.  More difficult schools need higher commitment levels from teachers.   
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This study examines predictors of organizational citizenship behavior, defined as acts that 
benefit an organization without care for personal recognition or reward, and analyzes the level of 
teacher altruistic acts that benefit the good of a school organization.  In simple terms, this study 
assesses the governing factor that motivates teachers to go above and beyond the normal call of 
duty or above their basic contractual agreement expectations.  This need for teachers to go above 
their basic expectations is greater in urban settings because their students are academically 
behind and have greater social and emotional needs than their middle- and upper- class suburban 
counterparts.   
1.2 Research Question  
Urban schools are in high need of motivated teachers to take on challenges their suburban 
counterparts rarely experience.  This effort is required to level the playing field to make urban 
settings as competitive and attractive as their higher socioeconomic counterparts, which could 
create equity among social groups.  It is the teacher motivating factor behind the altruistic 
behaviors that will help catch urban students up academically to their suburban peers that this 
study examines.  
This study adds to the current policy debate to find a school governance structure that 
encourages urban teachers to do more than officially expected.  The school governance debate 
argues that teachers are either motivated through monetary rewards, currently manifested as pay-
for-performance practices, or normative structures that are exhibited as professional learning 
communities.  The research question is, What motivates teachers to do more than officially 
expected? 
1.3 Significance  
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This study provides evidence using survey data from urban settings as to whether 
monetary or normative rewards best motivate teachers to go above their contractual agreement.  
The purpose of this study is to fill the research gap of relating altruistic acts, or organizational 
citizenship behavior, to reward structures that motivate teachers to extend beyond basic norms 
within the context of school governance.  Particularly, this study is important as it adds to the 
current policy debate of how to govern urban schools.  Some contend that teacher motivation is 
best governed through external monetary rewards (pay-for-performance practices), while others 
argue motivation stems from the development of a collaborative school climate (or, professional 
learning communities).  More explicitly, the gap in research is defining the best control 
mechanism, finances, normative/team control, or a hierarchical structure of rules that encourage 
teachers to exhibit higher levels of citizenship behavior.  In a classical study of organizational 
control, Ouchi (1980) broadly defined these mechanisms as markets, clans, and bureaucracies.   
Organizational citizenship behavior (OCB) puts a theoretical framework to the current 
school governance debate.  Where much is written on OCB in mainstream businesses, context 
studies of motivating factors to perform citizenship behavior in schools, specifically urban 
settings, is rare.  OCB research in education is either descriptive or focused on leadership traits.  
It is not related to alternative governing structures that motivate altruistic behaviors such as 
monetary rewards for performance and student achievement or normative based decision making 
in collaborative teacher teams.  
Finding quality teachers and meeting the needs of their student demographics has been an 
ongoing challenge for urban schools in crises.  Furthermore, the government has debated the 
solution to fix urban schools is to find mechanisms that foster teacher citizenship behavior.  
Currently, urban schools have become innovative in structuring teacher contracts that encourage 
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OCB.  Teachers in merit pay settings are paid for student and school outcomes, as well as 
personal performance criteria such as taking more professional development than expected. 
Relatively, merit pay to schools is market control to mainstream organizations.  Conversely, 
there is an argument that developing a culture rooted in collaboration will improve urban 
schools. Here, teachers are equally important to the collective process in identifying problems, 
finding solutions, and supporting each other.  These professional learning communities broadly 
utilize the clan control theory found in businesses.  The market and clan control theories that 
Ouchi defined in businesses came well before the current educational policy debate but provides 
the fundamental context to this study. 
This study addresses the relationship between control mechanisms that motivate teachers 
(which policy debate has determined as the solution) and teachers’ citizenship behavior. More 
specifically, it ask: which control configuration best motivates teachers to demonstrate 
organizational citizenship behavior?  
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CHAPTER TWO 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE  
2.1 Organizational Configurations to Motivate Teachers 
 The research question inherently suggests that the control theory studied herein serve as 
the independent variable and citizenship behavior as the dependent variable.  This study analyzes 
the effects of control on teacher citizenship behavior. 
Prior to studying control mechanisms, we first must define an organization as a group of 
persons organized for some end of work.  Ouchi (1980) supplies a more formal definition of an 
organization as a purposive aggregation of individuals who exert concerted effort toward a 
common and explicitly recognized goal.  Corporations with economic goals, arise when 
conditions demand stability that extends beyond individuals.  Ouchi (1980) further notes that 
individuals within organizations rarely have a common understanding goal.  Workers that have 
uncoordinated efforts will pursue their own interest, which is not in the best interest of 
efficiency.  Any collectivity which has an economic goal must then find a means to control 
diverse individuals efficiently (Ouchi, 1980).  It is this efficiency factor that serves the need for 
control theory.  
The principal element in defining an organization’s purpose is efficiency, or transaction 
cost.  This cost, interdependence between organization and individual calls for an exchange in 
which each individual gives something of value (labor) and receives something of value (money) 
in return (Ouchi, 1980).  One can look for clarity within transaction costs when it is difficult to 
define a value of goods and services that stem from distrust or from an ambiguous definition of 
value over services.  When competitive markets exist, the value and services requested are easily 
comparable to find a fair transaction cost.  For example, individuals can shop for a fair price in 
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lawn mowing services and conversely mowing companies have to stay competitive in prices 
within their marketplace to gain business.   
 However, it becomes much more difficult to place value on services that are unique.  In 
these situations, where competitive markets do not provide clear direction, each party relies on 
third party experts to estimate the value of services.  The negotiating parties may also side with 
explicitly defining the services being purchased through a thorough and complete contract that 
outlines each job performance.  In both situations, the transactions have costs and are necessary 
to create a perception of equity among all parties (Ouchi, 1980).  This same argument applies to 
transactions in which a service, such as the labor or an individual, is the object of exchange 
(Ouchi, 1980).  The true value of labor may be difficult to define when services are being sold.  
Furthermore, organizations exist because it can mediate economic transactions between its 
members at lower costs than a market mechanism can (Ouchi, 1980). The transaction cost 
mediates the relationship between the organization and employee, and is efficient when clear 
goals meet ambiguous job duties.   
In essence, Ouchi contributed to the understanding of organizational efficiencies.  This 
was done through the observation of transaction cost in organizations between two actors, the 
employee and employer.  Ouchi defined three control mechanisms using the transaction cost 
between employee and organization; bureaucracies, markets, and clans.  In some instances, 
markets have the most efficient transactional costs because the agreement between corporation 
and worker are mediated through contract done prior to the start of work, which outlines 
expectations of both fronts.  However, markets can become burdensome and less efficient than 
bureaucracies and clans.  
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Market transactions, or exchanges, consist of contractual relationships (Ouchi, 1980).   
Market relations are efficient when there is little ambiguity over performance, so the parties can 
tolerate relatively high levels of opportunism or goal incongruence (Ouchi, 1980).  The 
transaction cost in markets is mediated through competition where the employee and 
organization view the exchange as reasonable.  There are three types of contractual relationships 
within market control.   
The first relationship is the “spot” or “sales” contract where transactions are fulfilled on 
the spot.  For example, a student pays a tutor for a one hour session.  The second market 
agreement is the “small numbers bargaining” contract where only one buyer and seller exist.  
This is more simply understood as a mutual monopoly.  The final market contract is the 
“contingent claims” contract where a negotiated document indicates each party’s obligations.  In 
order to obtain market efficiency, the contract must have little ambiguity in evaluating employee 
performance.  This allows for tolerance in regards to each party’s high levels of opportunism and 
inconsistent goals.  It is the contingent claims contract that this research assesses within its study.  
Market control is most efficient when job expectations are clear and high levels of discrepancies 
in goals exist between the organization and employee.  
 When two parties have common goals and can agree upon the desired results, the 
organization can institute clan control.  Clans are efficient when goal incongruence is low and 
performance ambiguity is high (Ouchi, 1980).  In this control mechanism, there is a high degree 
of discipline displayed by employees, which is attained through an acute belief that the interest 
of the whole is served by complete immersion of each individual.  These so-called clans forms of 
organization thus have little need for formal mechanisms to mediate the exchange between 
individual and organization, because the employee’s natural inclination is to behave in ways that 
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are consistent with the organization’s objective (John R. Deckop, 1990).  However, there are 
high levels of uncertainty in regards to performance evaluation as action cannot be translated into 
certifiable measures.  [Clan success is] typically in technologically advanced or closely 
integrated industries, where teamwork is common, technologies change often, and therefore 
individual performance is highly ambiguous (Ouchi, 1980). 
Although clans differ fundamentally from bureaucracies in that they do not require 
explicit auditing or evaluation, the professionalized bureaucracy may be understood as a 
response to the joint need for efficient transactions within profession (clan) and between 
professions (bureaucracy) (Ouchi, 1980).  When subordinates perceive a trusting interpersonal 
relationship in which, for instance, agreements are diligently followed (promise fulfillment), 
subordinates are dealt with candidly (integrity), and supervisors listen (receptivity), subordinates 
seem willing to exceed formal job requirements (Deluga, 1995).  Clan control is the comparison 
motivating factor that this study assesses. 
 The third and final control mechanism is bureaucracy.  Bureaucracies are mediated by the 
concept of fairness and prove efficient when high levels of inconsistencies in goals and 
performance expectations exist.  Equity is defined and mediated through a social agreement, or a 
contract, that authority is granted to the bureaucratic hierarchy.  By and large, all organizations 
are bureaucracies.  Similarly, schools are part of a hierarchical bureaucratic system.  Schools 
report to their district, which again reports to a higher form of authority, the state who reports to 
the federal government.   The bureaucracy control mechanism is used within the contractual 
agreement between teacher and school, which is mediating the concept of fairness from one 
teacher to the next.  Within the negotiated agreement the teacher agrees to submit to the 
hierarchy leadership of the organization in return for compensation.   
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This study defines that all schools reside in a bureaucratic system within their district, 
state, and federal government.  The current policy debate, however, encourages schools to 
become innovative within this bureaucratic governing system and experiment as to whether the 
market or the clan sub-control theory (in this system) best motivates teachers to go above their 
contractual agreement, or the normal call of duty.   Schools, and largely urban schools, are 
experimenting with different forms of transactional cost.  Does monetary incentives, markets, or 
normative goals, clans, motivate teachers to demonstrate more citizenship behavior?   
2.2 Organizational Citizenship Behavior  
Altruistic behaviors have a positive impact on organizations and can be encouraged as 
well as discouraged based on the treatment given to subordinates.  In sum, it is predicted that 
there is a causal connection between prior overall satisfaction and subsequent display of a host of 
citizenship behaviors (Bateman and Organ, 1983).  We first address these altruistic behaviors 
from their origin. 
Most simply defined, organizational citizenship behavior, or OCB, is doing the right 
thing that benefits the greater good of an organization without receiving personal recognition or 
merit.  By its definition, OCB analyzes one’s individual and leadership traits that encourage acts 
that go above and beyond the normal call of duty and have a positive effect on an organization.  
Although a good deal of research has been conducted on organizational citizenship behavior, the 
development of OCB theory has progressed rather slowly (Konovsky and Pugh, 1994).  It was in 
1964 that Daniel Katz identified essential behaviors of employees that create an effective 
organization.  One behavior is that employees must engage in innovative and spontaneous 
activity that goes beyond role prescriptions (Konovsky and Pugh, 1994).  It was not until 1983 
that a more formal name was given to this description.  Every factory, office, or bureau depends 
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daily on a myriad of acts of cooperation, helpfulness, suggestions, gestures or goodwill, altruism, 
and other instances of what we might call citizenship behavior (Smith, Organ, & Near, 1983). 
More recently Michael DiPaola further defined citizenship behaviors within the 
educational setting.  However, these studies are limited by their scope to individual and 
leadership traits.  This study takes an important first step by going beyond current findings and 
exploring how OCB is influenced by school governance, or control theories.  No current study 
examines the question: Does developing a climate of collaboration (clan control) or paying 
teachers based on performance (market control) motivate teacher citizenship behaviors?  
Ouchi’s typology is consistent with the current merit pay or collaborative governing debate.  The 
theory is not specially about pay-for-performance or collaboration but bares upon it and is 
consistent and useful in addressing this research question in a theoretical framework.  Within, we 
examine the connection between school governance, using control theory, and teacher tendencies 
to do more than expected.  
Altruism and generalized compliance were the initial dimensions of organizational 
citizenship (DiPaola, 2007). Altruism is voluntarily helping others in need without concern to 
one’s own benefit or wellbeing.  Whereas doing the right thing to benefit an organization is the 
fundamental concept of generalized compliance.  Examples of one’s general compliance are 
being conscientious of attendance, use of work time, and adherence to various rules, but a 
conscientiousness that far surpasses any enforceable minimum standards (Organ, 1990).  Since 
then, the basic definition of OCB has been expanded to include the following five components: 
altruism, conscientiousness, sportsmanship, civic virtue, and courtesy (DiPaola, 2007).   
 A prerequisite to defining an act as citizenship behavior is that it cannot be required or 
expected by the organization or one’s superiors. Citizenship behavior surpasses any enforceable 
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minimum standards; workers willingly go beyond stated expectations in performing their roles 
(DiPaola, 2007).  Moreover, OCBs are manifested voluntarily and discretionarily and are a 
matter of choice.  OCB consists of informal contributions that participants can choose to proffer 
or withhold without regard to considerations of sanction or formal incentives (Organ, 1990).  
OCB actors individually define their own reward.  Any rewards provided to actors for 
performing citizenship acts are uncertain and unforeseen.  OCB also includes the quality of 
forbearance – the willingness to endure the occasional costs, inconveniences, and minor 
frustrations attendant to collective endeavors (Organ, 1990).   
 Individuals contribute to organizational effectiveness by doing things that are not main 
task functions but are important because they shape the organizational and social “context” that 
supports task activities (Organ & Ryan, 1995).  Citizenship behaviors include the initiative to 
provide constructive criticism or suggestions for improvement, helping others, volunteer for 
additional jobs or committee work, express interest on others’ work, and uphold workplace 
norms regardless of personal agreement or disagreement. In respect of the quality of forbearance, 
employees refrain from faulting others, do not complain about inconsequential matters, and 
reject starting arguments with other employees.   
Within the educational setting, teachers who voluntarily go out of their way to help their 
students, colleagues, and others as they engage in the work of teaching and learning exemplify 
organizational citizenship (DiPaola, 2007).  DiPaola and Costa Neves (2009) continue, stating 
teachers in schools with high citizenship take it upon themselves to volunteer innovative 
suggestions, sponsor extra-curricular activities, and serve on new committees.  These acts are the 
product of the teacher’s motivation to perform them, which this study contends are influenced by 
the school governance debate – money or climate.   
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2.2.1 Teacher OCB 
To further define OCB within education, this study assesses Oplatka’s (2006) four 
domains of teacher OCB; 1) individual pupil, 2) classroom, 3) staff, and 4) school organization.  
Teacher OCBs for individual students would be providing instructional assistance outside class 
time, assisting them when upset and proactively attending to pedagogical needs and difficulties.  
Inside the classroom, Oplatka (2006) defines OCB as teachers initiation and implementation of 
changes and innovations in teaching methods or curriculum, thorough and comprehensive 
grading of academic assignments, and involvement in social events of the class.  In working with 
a staff, teachers provide materials, assist with administrative tasks, and provide emotional 
support to colleagues.  Lastly, within the school organization, OCB is defined as teachers’ 
participation in school events after the school day, participation in ad hoc school committees, and 
taking on unrewarded roles in school (Oplatka, 2006).  
 Citizenship behaviors, over extended periods of time, and when combined with additional 
contributions, may result in favorable outcomes for the actor such as a job promotion, raise or 
bonus, or special privilege.  However, to be considered as OCB, the actor could not have 
foreseen or predicted these unknown benefits at the time of providing citizenship behaviors or 
receiving the benefit.  The actor would also not perform the behavior in hopes of receiving a 
benefit but rather because they foresaw a benefit to the organization or a colleague. Organization 
governance susceptible to fairness judgments probably act more generally to reduce or constrain 
the spontaneous, naturally occurring OCB among persons rather than to facilitate it (Organ, 
1990).  There is no indication that tenure with organization or gender has any appreciable 
connection with altruism (Organ & Ryan, 1995).  Organ and Ryan (1995) continue by stating 
only affective commitment is related to altruism. These are inherent obstacles within education 
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as governance within schools has typically been fostered through teacher fairness such as the 
payment step-ladders based on years of experience, level of education, and teacher tenure.   
  There are environmental cues and things subordinates seek that encourage acts of OCB.  
There is also a strong need for citizenship behaviors in formal structures; without creates a 
structure that would collapse as it is impossible to foresee all possible situations that will need 
flexible and self-initiated acts.  Formal structure does not suffice to anticipate all needed 
contributions; willingness to cooperate is the essential condition without which formal structure 
is an empty shell (Organ, 1990).  Organ (1990) continues, stating formal structure can only 
recognize what is already inherent in individual and collective willingness to cooperate. 
Furthermore, OCB is desirable from an organizational point of view because such behavior is 
thought to increase available resources and decrease the need for more formal and costly 
mechanisms of control (John R. Deckop, 1990).  
Although not every single action contributes to organizational effectiveness, over time 
the accumulation of OCB improves the effectiveness of the organization (DiPaola, 2009).  
Teachers with good citizenship seek ways to make their school more effective, defined as 
flexible, adaptable, innovative, and efficient. The very nature of professional teacher behavior 
calls for action beyond that which is officially mandated (DiPaola, 2007).  Here teachers 
efficiently use their time, are rarely gone from work, and work collaboratively. 
This study defines teacher acts of citizenship as behavior that extends beyond their 
normal call of duty, or their contractual minimum expectations. Teachers that take it upon 
themselves to identify opportunities to perform tasks that are not enforced or expected are 
demonstrating citizenship behaviors as long as the acts benefit the greater good of the school.  
Citizenship is more than an altruistic behavior.  Citizenship goes beyond an isolated act and 
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persist regularly within the individual to perform unrequired tasks that support the mission of the 
school.  The principal factor in this study defining citizenship is that the exhibited behavior is 
unexpected and the actor is willingly going beyond their contractual agreement.  
2.2.2 Teacher OCB Motivators  
Deckop et al. (1990) analyzed motivating factors of employees to perform extrarole 
behaviors in industries.  Within their study, they focused on motivating factors of the workforce 
employees, not CEOs, noting the lower-level employees do not have a lot of opportunity to 
affect key performance indicators.  Many firms base pay increments, awarded as merit pay, on 
subjective assessments of employee behaviors (Deckop et al., 1990).  This study takes a similar 
stance on analyzing OCB motivators of teachers, or the workforce employees. The principal 
finding in Deckop’s et al. (1990) study is that pay-for-performance practices are effective with 
employees that are committed to the values of the organization.   The contemporary 
manifestation of Ouchi’s market control in school settings today is pay-for-performance 
programs.   
Pay-for-performance had a negative impact on extrarole behaviors for employees low in 
value alignment but not for employees high in value alignment (John R. Deckop, 1990).  
Employees are less likely to perform OCBs when they perceive a strong link to performance pay, 
or market control.  In fact, organizations can discourage citizenship behaviors by specifying the 
acts of which will be rewarded.  Employees could be less likely to spontaneously perform 
citizenship behaviors as their focus would remain on tasks their employers recognize within its 
specified market contract.  Furthermore, subjects given difficult goals and incentives for task 
completion exhibited relatively low levels of spontaneous helping behaviors (John R. Deckop, 
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1990). This inherently conflicts with the simplest definition of OCB of performing tasks for the 
greater good of the organization without receiving recognition. 
Teachers may also be discouraged to perform OCBs if they feel it would have a negative 
effect on their wellbeing or benefits.  As current policy debate continues to evaluate market 
control within merit pay models, it must also consider unintentional consequences.  Teachers 
competing against each other for results may be less inclined to share information or help one 
another improve. Because most reward systems favor task performance, individuals may 
unintentionally hurt their careers by helping the organization (Bergeron, 2007).  Bergeron (2007) 
continues by stating if individuals spend time on behaviors that benefit the organization, it may 
be at the expense of their task performance and, thus, may be costly in terms of rewards and 
career advancement.  Teachers’ market reward model would also need to fit into the current 
tenured practices. In 2004, Feather and Rauter studied the citizenship behaviors between tenured 
and non-tenured teachers in Australia. As predicted, non-tenured teachers reported more 
citizenship behaviors than tenured teachers.  We would expect the [non-tenured] teachers to 
undertake extra-role behaviors and voluntary duties that would help their schools and improve 
their prospects of obtaining [tenured status] (Rauter, 2004).  
Citizenship behavior in schools logically implies high levels of intrinsic motivation.  Job 
satisfaction can affect citizenship behaviors.  Zeinabadi (2010) analyzed Bagozzi 1992 study on 
attitude-intention-behavior, which suggests that behavior is a coping activity that results from an 
individual’s appraisal of situation and subsequent emotional response.  This study is congruent 
with Organ (1990) findings that motivating intrinsic job satisfaction internally motivates the 
employee to display [OCB] (Zeinabadi, 2010).  Furthermore, teacher OCBs were found to be 
influenced by intrinsic teacher job satisfaction that also had an effect on teacher commitment.  
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One implication on principal-teacher relationship is that principals should afford intrinsic 
rewards (e.g. job meaningfulness, job responsibilities and job challenge) and endeavor to 
increase teacher’s sense of intrinsic satisfaction, rather than offering extrinsic rewards 
(Zeinabadi, 2010).  In a subsequent study it was found that procedural justice promoted teacher 
OCB (Salehi, 2011).  Procedural justice is defined as a process resolution method based on 
fairness.  Zeinabadi and Salehi (2011) found that procedural justice influenced teacher trust 
which in turn influenced job satisfaction and organizational commitment. 
Research on effective teams outside the education sphere also indicates that effectiveness 
depends in part on unified commitment from members (Stoll et al., 2006).  The contemporary 
manifestations of Ouchi’s clan control within schools today are professional learning 
communities, or teams.   Clans believe that the interest of an organization is served by complete 
individual entanglement into a common goal.  Professional learning communities reaffirm this 
sentiment.  In schools, PLCs share a common goal based on student achievement which is 
achieved through intense collaboration and data analysis.  Stoll et al. (2006) continues defining 
effectiveness by the loyalty to and identification with the team, fostered through a balance 
between respecting individual differences and requiring unity.  Developing clan communities 
contributes to a group’s capacity for continuous improvement.  Capacity is defined through skill, 
learning and the organization’s support structure and culture.  Put together, it gives individuals, 
groups, whole school communities and school systems the power to get involved in and sustain 
learning over time (Stoll et al., 2006).  This supports Ouchi’s clan control theory, which is 
fostered and sustained through a climate, or team.   
As the idea and implementation of PLCs has spread, the result is that their original 
meaning is becoming diminished and their richness is being lost (Stoll & Louis, 2007).  PLC 
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participation should be discretionary.  However, in many cases, PLCs have become mandated or 
required of teachers.  PLCs should be trusted groups of collaborators that make decisions based 
on evidence.  PLCs are turning into add-on teams that are driven by data in cultures of fear that 
demand instant results (Stoll & Louis, 2007).  This pushes discussion away from the goal of 
process improvement within the clan component.  Rather, energy is focused on manipulating 
student test results, such as test-preparation lessons, which meet the demand of society.  These 
quick-fix solutions do not improve the quality of instruction or teaching, which is a principal 
goal of collaborative learning communities.  Demanding that PLCs be data driven ultimately 
leads most of them to concentrate only on mandated tests (Stoll & Louis, 2007).  The experience 
of these communities should be inspiring and stimulate teacher innovation that works to improve 
schools rather than an additional student-learning intervention.  Stoll & Louis (2007) continue by 
stating PLCs must move beyond mandated teams that generate instant gains in tested 
achievement, to something that is more educationally sound and professionally sustainable.  
It is important to recognize that teachers enter the profession for multiple reasons and 
these motives may influence citizenship behaviors. However, no matter the reasoning behind 
becoming a teacher, finding teacher motivators to perform altruistic behaviors in urban schools is 
important to support its student demographics.  This study seeks to find the solution of which 
governing practice, Ouchi’s typology of clan or market, best encourages teacher citizenship 
behavior.  Moreover, this study is timely as current policy debate is experimenting with this very 
question.  Does building an urban climate based on teacher community motivate teachers to 
perform citizenship behavior or are teachers motivated by monetary rewards?   
2.3 OCB Expectations Under Current Governing Policy Practices  
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 The sustainability and success of effective urban schools demand organizational 
citizenship behaviors from its teachers.  Without their willingness to perform citizenship 
behaviors, students would suffer and schools could become illegitimate in state or local 
certification requirements.  Citizenship behaviors give purpose and originality to classroom and 
school structures that determine student success. 
 Therefore, with a need to perform OCB, it becomes logical that policy debate currently 
surrounds itself around governing practices that encourage this very behavior – merit pay or 
professional learning community practices.  Since OCB cannot be required or expected, 
professional learning communities stand to predispose teachers to these behaviors more than 
pay-for-performance practices.  A basic characteristic of OCB is altruism, which is consistent 
with the logic of Ouchi’s (1980) clan control theory in developing a community grounded in 
common goals.   
Clan control demands a high degree of obedience and compliance where the components 
of the efficient transaction cost are low goal incongruence and high performance ambiguity.  
Clans require little formal mediating mechanisms between subordinates and employer.  The 
current governing debate, substantiated through Ouchi’s clan control theory, is manifested in 
professional learning communities where teachers have common interest and goals that surround 
itself around the concept of student success.  These goals are team-developed among each other 
and are equivocal and rather large.  There is little need for mediating mechanisms with these 
goals as their tasks demand a sense of helpfulness, suggestions, cooperation, and goodwill, all 
qualities that have been defined in terms of OCB by Smith, Organ, & Near (1983).   
Here, teacher motivation stems from their commitment to the school and community 
where individuals serve the best interest of the whole through collective effort.  Cooperative 
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action necessarily involves interdependence between individuals (Ouchi, 1980). In essence, 
teachers work collaboratively over best practices, the future direction of lessons and the school, 
and hold one another accountable to results.  This clan control mechanism, utilizing the 
governing practice of professional learning communities, is dependent on commitment to a 
greater purpose.  Here, educators work together to achieve their collective purpose of learning 
for all (DuFour, 2004).  DuFour (2004) continues, stating the powerful collaboration that 
characterizes professional learning communities is a systemic process in which teachers work 
together to analyze and improve their classroom practice.  Since student success is an ambiguous 
goal, teachers innately welcome experimentation and innovation.  Teachers put extra time into 
developing new teaching strategies, lessons, and practices that will increase student achievement.  
Teachers demonstrating this effort unexpectedly or noncompulsory are performing altruistic acts.    
Furthermore, this union amongst teachers is founded on commitment, and is further 
explained through normative structures.  The central element in most definitions of commitment 
[is] the acceptance of organizational expectations and values as guides to an individual’s 
behavior where identification represents a form of normative control (Wiener, 1982).  Normative 
requirements refer to the basic social agreements that all members of the transactional network 
must share if the network is to function efficiently (Ouchi, 1980).  Individual actions in PLCs are 
motivated by their commitment to the overall school objective.   
Teacher PLCs (clans) do not mandate extraordinary behaviors.  Motivation to perform 
altruistic acts stem from the teacher’s desire to serve the urban population that has already been 
identified behind and in a state of crisis.  The organization benefits from altruistic acts performed 
by the teacher in their efforts of meeting student needs.  This community climate can generate a 
sustainable cycle of teacher citizenship behavior.  This is because the individual commitment is 
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to a common goal versus individual reward.  Vigoda-Gadot et al. (2007) believes that OCB exist 
in a collective form rather than merely in an individual form.  Teachers who do or do not display 
OCB do not do so in a vacuum, and the organizational context most likely serves to encourage or 
discourage them (Eran Vigoda-Gadot, 2007).   Therefore, a cycle of OCB is developed as one 
altruistic act encourages another.  
Manifesting citizenship behavior through professional learning communities is one side 
of the current policy debate.  Normative control motivates individuals through group goal 
settings. This study puts the governing factor at the heart of its research question. Does 
normative control motivate teachers to go beyond their normal call of duty or does the other side 
of the policy debate, incentivizing teachers through monetary rewards, motivate citizenship 
behaviors more?   
This other side of the policy debate contends that effort in motivating urban teachers is to 
utilize the contingent claims contract within the typology of Ouchi’s market mechanism.  This 
pay-for-performance control motivates teacher citizenship behavior through reward.  The 
additional pay is based on meeting set requirements that extend beyond the basic expectations of 
the contractual agreement.  These additional standards are not required or evaluative, rather 
determined by the individual teacher of whether they will perform extrarole duties.  Examples of 
these extra duties are gaining additional teacher certifications, increasing parent communication, 
increasing personal attendance, and collective student academic growth.  Many districts have 
become innovative in these efforts and identified district-specific reward areas.    
It is logical that unrequired and unexpected acts cannot be predetermined and outlined for 
teachers to perform in order to receive reward.  Pay-for-performance motivates teachers to non-
compulsorily go above their contractual agreement through predetermined and assessed levels.  
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Teachers in this model set performance goals that reward them at the compensation level they 
feel is appropriately affixed to each action.  These actions taken together can have a positive 
effect on student outcomes.    
Teachers will stop extrarole behavior at the level of which they are rewarded.  By clearly 
specifying behaviors and outputs that will be rewarded, organizations risk discouraging 
behaviors that will not be explicitly rewarded (Deckop, 1990).  In fact, Deckop (1990) found that 
the stronger the link is between pay incentives to the desired behaviors, the less likely employees 
are to engage in OCB.  Pay-for-performance by its delineation is antithetical to the logic of 
altruism.  It is difficult to comprehend the motivation in this model for teachers to perform 
altruistic acts that have not been defined.   
Another perspective is that these defined acts, although teachers could choose to withhold 
these acts, provide specific guidelines from supervisors to reach the compensation level of their 
satisfaction, and thus defining compensation expectations.  This is contradictory to the definition 
of OCB and therefore, through logical reasoning, acts of altruism are likely to be higher under 
clan control than under market.  It is reasonable to believe that teachers are motivated more to 
demonstrate citizenship behaviors through professional learning communities.  
2.4 The Need of Urban OCB 
It is inherently understood that OCB requires high levels of teacher motivation.  There is 
a high need for these unselfish acts in urban schools as their population has more complex 
problems than other school settings.  Urban districts deal with higher levels of crime rate, have 
consistently more severe types of crime within their neighborhoods, families may value 
education to the limit of a safe haven during the day, and students are often times grade levels 
behind where they ought to be.   
22 
Urban settings are further complicated by their lack of resources.  Wealthier suburban 
districts have higher paying salaries, better recruiting methods and resources, and better working 
conditions.  Furthermore, the differences in beliefs, values, and purpose of education has not 
only added to the differences in suburban and urban demographics but also divided communities 
by the ability of families to move to, and build, neighborhoods that meet their expectations. 
These qualities draw personnel away from urban settings and contribute to the discretion of 
where teachers choose to work.  The teacher turnover rate in the urban schools is much higher 
than in the suburban schools and in more stable communities (Crosby, 1999).  Urban schools are 
unable to compete with the resources their counterparts can offer their students and families.  It 
is unfortunate that where the need is greatest, the supply is smallest (Crosby, 1999).  Not only do 
urban schools need to retain good teachers.  They also must call upon their teachers to 
demonstrate higher levels of altruistic behaviors that give the urban setting a fighting chance to 
serve their student population at the same level as suburban schools.   
Urban settings require a different, higher energy level from teachers than their suburban 
counterparts.  This is because student achievement and outcomes in urban settings are under 
heavy controversy and watch, whereas suburban schools need only to maintain a competitive 
edge in student achievement over their competition.  In the current professional learning 
community and pay-for-performance policy debate, student achievement is achieved through the 
factors that motivate teacher citizenship behaviors.  Moreover, the best control mechanism to 
motivate teachers is continuously contended because of the ambiguity in the purpose of schools.  
It is heavily argued that the objective of schools is ambiguous and uncertain.  Aldrich 
(2008) argues that the objective of schools, like industrial and business organizations, is to 
produce outputs from inputs.  Urban schools have even a greater level of goal ambiguity.  Urban 
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settings must prioritize their outputs – student achievement, school safety, student hunger and 
clothing.  Suburban settings are fortunate to only need to focus on student achievement, which in 
itself is a highly ambiguous definition.  Similarly teaching is highly equivocal. Teaching is 
characterized as an ambiguous, uncertain organizational technology with value boundaries and 
an unclear input-process-outcome connection (Oplatka, 2006).  This is critical to understand as 
the control mechanism implemented in urban settings may transform based on the type of teacher 
recruited to work in these schools.  It takes a particular individual to work in an urban setting.  
As noted above, urban schools work to meet the needs of the student population of minority and 
low income students as well as work to meet Maslow’s hierarchy of needs and safety.  
Since teachers enter the profession for many different reasons, and in some situations 
because of its ease of entry, it is important to find the best control theory to motivate teachers to 
go above the minimum requirements.  Since their inception, districts and schools have 
experimented with all three control theories.  School systems, like other organizations, do 
employ a variety of [control] mechanisms (Ouchi, 1980).    Because of the local control districts 
have over education, they are able to experiment with the transactional costs (control 
mechanism) between teacher and organization.  It has not been until late that districts and 
schools have stepped outside the norm with innovative techniques.  Urban settings have been 
more aggressive in their efforts to find a control theory that motivates teachers to extend 
practices beyond their contractual agreement.  It is this progressive professional learning 
community or merit pay policy debate that this study seeks answering.  Are teachers motivated 
by pay-for-performance (market) or professional learning communities (clan)?   
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CHAPTER THREE 
METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
3.1 Methodology and Data  
This small sample study compares two districts, each representing one of the current 
governing practices, pay-for-performance and professional learning communities, assessing 
within urban elementary settings the mechanism that better motivates teachers to go above their 
contractual agreement.  Each school setting has an urban student demographic population, 
defined by high minority and low income, or free or reduced lunch, percentages. Bryk et al. 
(2010) described that student populations in urban schools tend to be described in terms of two 
basic statistics: percentage minority and percentage low income.   
This section begins with comparing the two control theories that are established within 
their respective school settings.  Market control is represented by pay-for-performance (PFP) 
schools and professional learning communities (PLC) utilize Ouchi’s clan control theory.   Next, 
the procedure of disseminating the teacher questionnaire within participating schools will be 
explained.  Finally, this study will describe the data analysis structure and outcome expectations.    
3.2 PFP vs. PLC  
 The PFP district has ten elementary schools that utilize their pay-for-performance 
structure.  The PLC comparison group represents six elementary schools in three neighboring 
school districts.  After a factor analysis, the study becomes a true comparison of one pay-for-
performance district to a professional learning community district.  The following chart provides 
an overview of the original participating settings. 
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The following three tables further define the sites of the original participating schools that 
are included in this small scale study.  Table 1 provides averages of all student demographic 
populations for each control theory group for the past three years (2011 – 2013).  Both the PFP 
and PLC settings have high free and reduced lunch and minority populations as well as similar 
ELL and IEP proportional attendance rates.  The PFP schools average more years of experience 
from their professional staff.  This could provide an advantage over PLC schools as their 
employees seem to be committed to remaining in their current roles.  However, PLC schools 
have higher attendance rates, which could be a result of students feeling more welcome and 
encouraged from their teachers demonstrating OCB acts.    
 
 
(Missouri Comprehensive Data System, n.d.) 
 
Table 2 and Table 3 below show all specific data of each school within each control 
theory.  These tables show specific school data between the years of 2011 to 2013.  The PFP 
schools represented in Table 2 demonstrate their similarity in urban student population makeup 
as defined by Bryk et al. (2010) or high minority and low income students.  The range of free 
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and reduced lunch between these schools is 79.6% to 94.5%, a difference of 14.9 points.  At any 
given point within the three years of data among these schools, the largest white population was 
26.3%.  The average years of teaching experience in PFP schools was 14.5 years in comparison 
to PLC schools of 10.8 years of experience. 
 Table 3 below, representing professional learning communities shows their range of 
minority students from 37.2% to 89.3%.  These schools had a more similar range of low income 
students to their comparison PFP schools of 26.6 points, with a maximum FRL percentage out of 
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3.2.1 PFP Schools  
The PFP district implemented their monetary incentive program in ten of their elementary 
schools, chosen by a formula defined below.  This urban district resides in the state of Missouri 
and has experienced a declining enrollment since 2004.  Today, the district has an enrollment of 
15,625 students.  In 2010 the district sought alternative teacher motivation structures and 
received a grant from the federal government titled PIONEER Program.  The PIONEER program 
allowed the district to experiment with monetary incentives for teachers that performed tasks 
above their contractual agreement or changed behavior that is not assessed on evaluation cycles.  
The grant was written in 2010 and expires in 2015.  The district received grant money in the 
2010-11 school year, which served as their planning year.  Here the district finalized 
implementation strategies, officially beginning the incentive base payout to teachers in the 2011-
12 school year. 
Elementary schools with the highest ranked needs were asked to participate in the 
program.  In order to participate, 75% of the faculty had to agree to the program’s criteria.  If less 
than 75% of the faculty agreed, the district went to the next highest ranked school until ten 
schools agreed to participate. The district identified at-risk factors that would rank schools in the 
highest to lowest comparable needs.  Although race is a significant factor, it was not considered 
in the districts highest at-risk formula because all the schools were 90% or greater student 
minority. 
The district used a category weight (based on 1.00) assigned formula based on the degree 
of at-risk.  Schools are ranked in order of the greatest need receiving the greatest rank in four 
areas.  The four weighted categories are percent of student poverty, composite MAP scores, 
school size, and percent of ELL.  Their weight into the overall formula is: 
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At-Risk (1.00) = Poverty (.35) + MAP scores (.15 reading | .15 mathematics) + 
Size (.20) + ELL (.15)  
 
 Poverty is defined by students that qualify for the federal free and reduced lunch price 
program.  The Missouri Assessment Program, or MAP, is the Missouri’s state standardized 
assessment.  After schools were ranked, a district group approached the faculty to gage their 
interest in the PIONEER Program.  The program began in each of the participating elementary 
schools in the 2011-12 school year.  Incentive payouts are for certified staff only.   
 Participants in the program can make additional money but cannot lose money.  Each 
participant is eligible to earn a ten thousand dollar ($10,000) bonus, dependent on their job 
performance.  The four areas teachers can earn monetary rewards are professional growth, wrap 
around, building growth, and performance assessment.  The below table further outlines the 
incentive rewards within each category. 
 





Participants who gained certification from the National 
Board of Professional Teaching Standards in any subject 
area. 
$200 
Extra PD Hours Participation in 20 hours of optional professional 




Attendance  Participants that missed fewer than 22.5 hours of the 
school year (3 days). 
$500 
 Participants that missed fewer than 37.5 hours of the 
school year (5 days).  
$275 
Discipline Participants that reduced the number of discipline referrals 
they wrote by 25%.* 
$500 
 Participants that reduced the number of discipline referrals 




Participants who had 95% of their parents come to the 
building for a conference during the week of parent-teacher 
conferences in both the spring and fall and also had 10 
$500 
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communications with parents of every student they served. 
 Participants who had 90% of their parents attend in-person 
conferences (regardless of 10 communications with parents 
of their students). 
$200 
Building Growth 
Growth Participants in buildings whose average value-added was 
higher than the district’s average value-added. 
$2,500 
Performance Assessment 
 Participants who earned a final summary rating of 
“Distinguished.” 
$2,000 
 Participants who earned a final summary rating of 
“Proficient.” 
$1,000 
 Participants whose classroom average value-added was 
greater than the district’s average value-added in math. 
$500 
 Participants whose classroom average value-added was 
greater than the district’s average value-added in 
communication arts. 
$500 
*In 2013-14, the criteria changed to assess the percent of discipline notices decreased building-
wide versus individual teacher.  
 
It is critical to understand that for this study the structure of this pay-for-performance 
program differs from other merit pay structures.  This study used teacher perception data to 
examine the better motivating factor to get teachers to go above their normal call of duty, paying 
them more or building a climate grounded in common beliefs and goals.  In order to use 
perception survey data, the study first needed to define that this pay-for-performance reward 
structure does not compare teachers against each other, which would ultimately create teacher 
competition.  Unlike many other PFP programs where teachers can be pitted against each other 
in order to make more money, this setting provides a large enough pot of money that all 
participants can receive the same maximum reward of ten thousand dollars.  In essence, teachers 
are rewarded on evaluative criteria of their own performances, such as attendance and parent 




The program’s incentive payouts began in 2012.  There are currently two years of data 
collected on the percent of certified staff receiving incentives. This is reported out from the 
district and included in Table 4 below.  The district is in their third year of implementation.   
 The district changed the incentive criteria for parent engagement in the 2012-13 school 
year.  Rather than combining the parent-teacher conferences with the number of parent contacts, 
it separated it into two categories.  The table also shows a decline in the number of teachers 
given the rating of “Distinguished,” going from 30 teachers in 2012 to 14 distinguished teachers 
in 2013.  It is believed the decline is due to the release of five elementary principals, who 
provided higher evaluation ratings to teachers than they deserved.   
A limitation to this program was the method of which the program was introduced to the 
faculty.  Schools were approached to participate in the PIONEER Program very shortly after 
many faculty members received written notice they were being laid off at the end of the school 
year due to a reduction in force.  Therefore, at the time of the faculty vote, there was a lack of 
trust between employees and the district.  This hindered the ability for faculty to see the full 




 3.2.2 PLC Urban Schools  
 The participating six PLC elementary schools are part of three separate districts, all 
adjacent to the PFP district.  Four of the six elementary schools come from one district that has 
just under 19,000 students.  This district has 73.98% of their student population that receives free 
or reduced lunch and a student white population of 55.05%, with a large Hispanic population of 
16%.  The majority of their students, 74%, receive benefits from the federal free and reduced 
lunch program.  These schools represent four of the twenty-one elementary schools in the district 
and were selected because they had the most diverse and urban demographic student populations, 
defined by Bryk et al. (2010).  These schools had the highest percentages of minority and low 
socioeconomic student populations of the other elementary settings in their district. 
 The other two elementary settings come from smaller districts, with student populations 
of 6,300 and 2,300 students.  These schools are the only elementary settings that agreed to 
participate in the study from their respective districts. They have 86.4% and 74.1% of students 
receiving free or reduced lunch with 11.4% and 19.6% white populations, respectively. Due to 
the PFP district’s lack of accreditation by the state of Missouri, these two schools have adopted 
many students that chose to move out of the PFP schools.  These two schools are eventually 
omitted from the study due to their small response rates after a factor analysis, leaving a 
comparison of a merit pay district to one pay-for-performance district. 
 All PLC administrations implemented professional learning communities on their own 
accord, as it was not mandated from their district offices.  Although one school is still in their 
first few years of implementation, they all set specific time aside for staff members to collaborate 
together. Having collaborative time built into the school day is a major quality of professional 
learning communities.  There are no district level accountability measures for the individual 
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school implementation of PLCs.  Rather, the PLCs are monitored by the building level 
administrations.  Here, administrators actively participate in collaborative meetings with staff 
and hold teachers accountable to using their allotted group time each week.  Each week fifty 
minutes is set aside for vertical collaboration, or collaboration among grade levels.  Four days a 
week teachers are expected to collaborate horizontally with their grade level specific teachers. 
   During collaborative sessions, teachers use previous data to set goals, discuss student 
behavior concerns, upcoming lessons and objectives, have group meetings with parents and 
students, and reflect on their behavior.  Each PLC reports to building administrators on a weekly 
basis of their progress towards goals and the how they used the collaborative time.  
Administrators and counselors also use PLC time to share and receive critical student 
information.  The PLCs have become an integral part of how the schools operate, dictating the 
master calendar, plan periods, and elective offerings.   
3.3 Questionnaire 
 After the general information portion of the survey regarding income, gender, and years 
of experience, the survey is broken down into two main parts, an OCB and PLC section.  The 
OCB questions for this study are based on previous OCB scales in existing literature.  It includes 
questions within categories of the five discretionary citizenship - altruism, conscientiousness, 
sportsmanship, civic virtue, and courtesy. Using OCB scales within both the business and 
educational setting as examples, the survey questions were slightly modified to gain insight into 
teacher OCB practices in the merit pay and PLC models.   
 There are twenty-two OCB questions that are on a five-point Likert scale from Never (1) 
to Sometimes (3) to Always (5).  These questions are analyzing the perception of teachers that 
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their colleagues go above the normal call of duty such as making home visits and volunteering 
for subcommittees.  The other section of the survey focuses its attention on PLC practices. 
 There are fifteen questions regarding collaboration practices on a five-point Likert scale 
of Strongly Disagree (1) to Strongly Agree (5).  These questions stem from previously developed 
professional learning community surveys and analyze the perception of teachers of their 
colleagues to participate fully in collaborative efforts. The main purpose of these questions are to 
provide a second comparison data set to determine if pay-for-performance schools create a sense 
of competition among colleagues, which would foster an environment that teachers work in 
isolated silos.  Recall that this study first identified a merit pay setting that was consciously 
structured to eliminate teacher competition amongst colleagues, where competition could have 
created biases in teacher responses to the OCB questions and ultimately create reliability and 
validity programs in the data collection.  However, since this study used districts, that in both 
settings, teachers could work together to achieve their individual or collective rewards, the 
perception data is dependable.     
The voluntary survey was disseminated via SurveyMonkey and sent electronically to 
participating schools.  The survey took participants less than ten minutes to complete. Two 
follow-up emails were sent to participating schools; first, two weeks after the initial 
dissemination and the second 12 days after the original email was sent to teachers.  Below is the 
survey that was given to teachers.  
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Teacher Survey  
General Information: 
1. What grade level do you teach? 
2. How many years of teaching experience do you have? 
3. What is your gender? 
4. What is the highest degree you have received? 
5. What is your ethnicity? 
6. What is your annual income in your current position? 
7. How many years have you been in your current teaching position? 
8. (PLC – Questions): The following questions are on a five-point Likert scale. Please 
respond to each question on the scale of Strongly Disagree (1), Neutral (3), to Strongly 
Agree (5).   
Each statement begins with Teachers In My School... 
a. Are always excited to share ideas and teaching practices with one another. 
b. Are always willing to offer advice to help improve their colleagues' performance. 
c. Always help each other out. 
d. Are always willing to share student data when interacting with colleagues. 
e. Are always motivated to share effective instructional methods and teaching 
philosophies with colleagues. 
f. Get chances to benefit from one another only when it is reciprocated. 
g. Never put themselves before the wellbeing of the entire school. 
h. Always feel competitive when observed by other teachers. 
i. Always enjoy opportunities to observe one another teach. 
j. Always feel competitive when colleagues ask for advice or support. 
k. Agree to collaborate with colleagues to develop teaching materials and activities 
only when it benefits them personally. 
l. Always measure their own success relative to others. 
m. Are always willing to volunteer their time to assist one another. 
n. Consider extra compensation as the most important reason to do more. 
o. Tend to view their own success as more important than that of their colleagues. 
9. (OCB –Questions):The following questions are on a five-point Likert scale. Please 
respond to each question on the scale of Never (1), Sometimes (3), to Always (5).  
Each statement begins with Teachers In My School... 
a. Volunteer free assistance to students on their own time. 
b. Offer innovative solutions to identify problems. 
c. Volunteer to mentor new teachers. 
d. Arrive and depart to work and meetings on time. 
e. View committees in this school as effective. 
f. Volunteer to help colleagues in their absence or when they fall behind. 
g. Volunteer assistance to substitutes and guests regularly. 
h. Volunteer for ad hoc committees (subcommittees). 
i. Use their entire instructional time throughout each day. 
j. Remain current on instructional and curriculum practices. 
k. Make phone calls home about positive behaviors. 
l. Make home visits. 
m. Use all their allotted vacation days. 
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n. Differentiate instruction regularly to meet individual student needs. 
o. Seek professional development above the basic requirements. 
p. Communicate foreseeable absences in a timely manner. 
q. Use all their allotted sick leaves. 
r. Complete work at home. 
s. Greet students at the door each class period. 
t. Attend student activities outside the school setting. 
u. Enjoy coming to work on a daily basis. 
v. Have time provided to them for teacher collaboration. 
 
3.4 Data Analysis   
 This study assessed the level of teacher motivation to go above normal expectations 
given to them through school control mechanisms.  The independent variable is the control 
theory utilized within the contemporary governing practice, pay-for-performance (market) or 
professional learning communities (clan).  The dependent variable is teacher citizenship 






 The two policies tested are the pay-for-performance and professional learning community 
practices.  It is logical to believe that PLCs will encourage greater percentages of OCB as 
citizenship behavior cannot be expected or required.  Groups of teachers in the PLC model 
surround each other around common purposes and goals.  Whereas, the merit pay model is 
expected to encourage behaviors that are specifically outlined for individual rewards but not 
believed to encourage behavior that extends beyond reward recognition.  The null hypothesis, 
there is no difference in teacher motivation to go above their contractual agreement, was 
expected to be rejected.  The expected outcome was that PLC schools will demonstrate higher 
levels of organizational citizenship behaviors. 
 The steps outlined below were followed in analyzing the data: 
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1. Demographic data tables were gathered and assessed, comparing the two control 
practices. 
2. A two-sample t-test was performed, comparing mean scores of the control practices. 
3. Descriptive data was ran assessing controls, and mean scores of OCB and PLC 
questions. 
(All non-teachers were omitted from the study) 
4. A factor analysis of the districts was performed.  
(The two districts representing one elementary each were omitted from this small 
scale study.) 
5. A new demographic table was gathered and assessed.  
6. A factor analysis of the OCB questions was done. 
(Three questions were heavy outliers and were omitted from the study.) 
7. A second two-sample t-test was performed comparing means of the control theories. 
8. A regression model was performed, comparing governing practices of teacher 
perceptions of their colleagues to perform OCB.  
9. A second regression model was performed, adding the control of PLC attitudes. This 
allowed the study to assess whether PLC sites utilized PLC best practices. 
10. The PLC attitudes control was removed, and seven additional controls were added in 





4.1 Review of Hypothesis  
The purpose of this study is to examine teacher motivating factors that influence 
organizational citizenship behavior.  Moreover, this study seeks to determine the relationship 
between school control factors, specifically market and clan control, and teacher motivation to 
perform acts above the normal call of duty.  Are teachers motivated to perform these acts 
because they are rewarded monetarily or through normative practices? The research question is, 
Which control configuration best motivates teachers to demonstrate organizational citizenship 
behavior?  
 This study is significant because it closes the research gap between the school 
governance debate and citizenship behavior. Currently, in urban settings the policy debate over 
school governance argues teachers are motivated either through monetary or community 
rewards. The gap in research resides in defining the best governing control configuration that 
motivates teachers to give more of themselves in order to benefit the, already behind, students in 
urban schools.  
 This study test the null hypothesis between pay-for-performance and professional 
learning communities; HN: µPFP = µPLC.  The following chapter presents the statistical analyses 
completed in this study to answer the research question.  After the online questionnaires were 
completed through SurveyMonkey, the data were imported into a Stata package.  The descriptive 
statistics are found in Table 5, below.  
4.2 Survey Participants and Descriptive Data 
40 
There were a total of four school districts and 265 educators that participated in the 
survey.  Two of the four districts had large response rates of 148 (65%) and 80 (35%) 
participants and included multiple buildings within the school district.  The other two districts 
represented one building each and had 21 or fewer respondents to the survey.  After a factor 
analysis between districts, the two smaller districts were omitted from the study, leaving a true 
pay-for-performance district comparison to a professional learning community district.  Table 5 
below has the comparison population percentages of the two comparison groups with the omitted 
clan districts information removed.  This table is updated from its original, Table 1. 
 
The large districts that remained in the study represented market, with 148 participants, 
and clan control with 80 responses.  Four participants within these two districts were not teachers 
and were omitted along with one outlier in respect to salary was removed from the study, leaving 
a total of 223 teacher participants.  Table 6 shows that of the remaining 146 (65%) teachers 
represented from the market district and 77 (35%) from the clan district, 200 (90%) were female.  
The control of teacher tenure was performed to assess whether OCB declined after teachers 
found security within their tenured status.  Tenured status is defined by the state of Missouri 
when teachers start their sixth year of education. There were 165 (74%) participants that were 
tenured.   
The majority of participants, 72.65 percent, had a master’s degree or higher and were 
white or Caucasian at 68.16 percent.  There are a total of 47 Black participants, 12 Hispanic, and 
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12 other races included in the study.  This is interesting as the two districts had high minority 
student populations with only 9.1 (market district) and 55 (clan district) percentages of white 
populations.  Although this study controls for teacher ethnicity, it is interesting to think that in 
both settings, students are benefiting from teachers that more than likely have different life 























Note: Total participants = 223; Graduate Degree = master's 
degree or higher.
Table 6 - Descriptive Data of Participants
 
There were a total of twenty-two OCB questions that were classified into subgroups of 
the five discretionary behaviors that define citizenship - altruism, conscientiousness, 
sportsmanship, civic virtue, and courtesy.  After a factor analysis of these OCB questions, three 
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(questions 12, 13, and 17) were found to be empirically different from the others and were 
omitted from the results.  Furthermore, an exploratory factor analysis was conducted to explore 
the sub-dimensions of the OCB construct.  Unfortunately, the sub-dimensions in the 
questionnaire were not empirically verified and the researcher used all remaining OCB questions 
as one total construct. 
Table 7 below includes the statistics of all 223 participants with their responses to the 
OCB and PLC constructs, as well as their level of income and experience. Three teachers did not 
answer the OCB construct.  Of the remaining participants, the mean OCB score was 3.75 out of a 
5 point scale (SD = .56).  All 223 participants are represented in the PLC construct with a mean 
score of 3.37 out of 5 (SD = .48).  There was an average teacher income of $49,215.60 with a 
mean of 15.26 (SD = 11.10) years of experience.  
N Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum
OCB 220 3.75 0.56 2.16 5
PLC 223 3.37 0.48 1.67 5
Income 210 49215.60 11618.46 24000 76000
Experience 223 15.26 11.10 0 47
Note: Total = 223; OCB = average of all OCB 5-point Likert scale questions in the survey, omitting 
questions 12, 13, and 17; PLC = average of all PLC 5-point Likert scale questions in the survey; Income = 
teacher salary; Experience = number of years of teaching experience.
Table 7 - Descriptive Data of Questionnaire
 
4.3 PLC Effect on OCB 
The district with 146 participants utilized the market configuration to motivate teachers 
whereas the district with 77 participants applied normative controls through their use of 
professional learning communities.  To test the null hypothesis of this research study, a 
regression analysis was performed to examine the effects that control configurations had on 
citizenship behavior, depicted in Table 8, below. 
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H0: There is no relationship between the control configuration and teacher 
citizenship behavior as measured by the OCB construct. 














p < .001.  
 This regression analysis rejects the null hypothesis and shows clan control does in fact 
have a statistical significant effect (p-value < .001) on organizational citizenship behavior.  The 
PLC control represents the control theory utilized within the two participating districts.  The 
unadjusted mean difference between the market and clan configurations is .251 on a 5 point 
scale.  This is a meaningful finding with a total sample size of 220 cases.  The linear regression 
equation of OCB = 3.667 +.251PLC means that the average respondent in the PLC site, their 
response to the question of whether their colleagues manifest OCB, is .251 units greater than the 
response of the average participants in the PFP site.  This means specifically PLC respondents 
believe their colleagues manifest OCB behavior .251 units more than the average PFP 
participants.  In simple terms this basically means that teachers in the PLC context exhibit more 
OCB than their counterparts in the PFP context.  
This finding of teachers that work towards common beliefs and goals will present more 
altruistic behaviors was expected as their reward is measured in community outcomes.  Contrary 
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to this finding, an increase in market control would predict that teachers would exhaust the 
amount of energy needed to receive their fixed desired reward or predetermined outcome reward 
levels.   
 Table 9, below, adds the control of the PLC attitudes, or the PLC mean survey responses.  
The PLC survey questions, or attitudes towards PLC practices, were given to both the PLC and 
PFP sites.  This regression model accounts for how both sites implement collaborative efforts 
within the control theory practiced.  This demonstrates that the measure of the PLC attitudes are 
congruent to the measure of the PLC district site control, which is tested throughout the 
additional regression models. When controlling for the perceptions of other teachers’ 
collaborative behavior, the PLC effect on citizenship behavior is diminished to .148 units.  This 
is a negative difference of .103 effect on citizenship behavior, which at 220 cases is substantial. 
The measure of the perception of others’ collaboration efforts has a significant (p < .001) 
influence on the effect of the district clan control on teacher citizenship, meaning the measures 
are the same.  The survey PLC questions are removed from the regression models that are found 


















p < .001. 
**
p < .05.  
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To further explore the relationship between clan control and citizenship behavior, 
additional regression models with the dependent variable of organizational citizenship behavior 
were ran to introduce controls, after taking out the PLC attitudes, in a step-by-step fashion.  
Regression models 3 – 10 are depicted in Table 10, below.  
 Similar to the first regression finding, the subsequent analyses rejected the null 
hypothesis, depicting clan control had a significant (p-value < .001) impact on teacher 
perceptions of colleagues to demonstrate citizenship behavior.  After all eight controls were 
added, the perception of the clan effect on OCB persisted throughout the models and to some 
degree, even grew irrespective of the additional controls.  Model ten represents that respondents 
in the PLC site are on average demonstrating .370 units more of OCB than the average 
respondents in the PFP site, when controlling for all factors.  The average difference in the 
perception of how one’s colleagues demonstrate citizenship behavior between a PLC site and 
PFP site are in favor that PLC control encourages higher teacher motivation to perform acts 
above the normal call of duty.  In essence, people in PLC settings believe that their colleagues 
exhibit more OCB than people in PFP settings think their colleagues demonstrate.  Accounting 
for all the controls in model ten there is a positive .119 increase in OCB from its original model 
one regression.  In simple terms when analyzing the teacher perception of OCB, this study 
demonstrates that teachers in the PLC site exhibit higher levels of citizenship behavior than their 
counterpart site of market control, or pay-for-performance.  
A substantial finding is that the robust effect of clan control on OCB continued to grow 
with each additional control factor, with the largest increase occurring with the factor of 
experience.  When controlling for teacher tenure, greater than five years of teacher experience, 
there is a small positive influence of .011 on citizenship behavior from the collaborative control 
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theory. However, model 5 demonstrates that clan control is interacting most with teacher 
experience, a positive effect of .032 on OCB, meaning that the influence of clan control on the 
citizenship behavior varies by teacher experience more than the status of a tenured teacher.  This 
is interesting as many argue that once teachers become tenured, their efforts diminish due to their 
higher levels of job security.  This study argues that the collaborative community can overcome 
the tenured security status.  Teachers with higher levels of experience can offer more to the 
collaborative process than teachers with less experience. Furthermore, community goals motivate 
teachers to reach above their contractual agreement above years of experience.  
 In Model 3, the table shows that both income and clan control have a positive significant 
(p-value < .001) effect on teachers to perform OCB.  Controlling for the gender factor has no 
influence to the overall linear regression model.  Interestingly, the Hispanic race/ethnicity control 
factor shows a positive significant (p-value < .100) influence on the model.  The market and clan 
districts are 20.6 and 15.83, respectively, percentage Hispanic.  The Hispanic population in the 
clan district is larger than any other minority race percentage.  Since the PFP site has a higher 
percentage of Hispanic students, the teacher Hispanic control is simply picking up the residual 
PLC effect on the overall model.  It is worth noting that the population makeup of the districts is 
not hurting the PLC effect but positively influencing the overall effect on citizenship. 
 Again, these findings are consistent with the literature.  As additional control factors are 
added to the model the larger the impact clan control has on OCB.  The linear model is: 
OCB = Constant + β1PLC + Controls. 
The literature would argue that the market and clan configurations adopt the controls that are 
added within this study.  The control configurations act as the umbrella of the model, 
influencing, from a top-down initiative, how the additional controls interact with each other, and 
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ultimately impacting citizenship behavior.  Relatively, females should be influenced the same to 
perform OCB as males in whichever control configuration they reside.  Similarly, teacher salary, 
teacher tenure, years of experience, race, the grade they teach, degree status, and number of years 
in their current position would have minor influence on OCB.  An agreed upon salary would not 
have a heavy impact on OCB.  Rather, it is the reward that motivates teachers, which within a 
market control could be a bonus and would encourage the input of a teacher to match their 
desired reward output.  However, since clan control reward is based on a common set of beliefs, 
the input of a teacher would match their commitment to the overall goals of the professional 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 The following chapter provides a summary of the study, including the rationale and 
constructs used.  Moreover, the following pages will review the research method, the results of 
the study and their implications, limitations of the study, and future directions to add onto this 
research.   
5.1 Rationale for the Study 
 School reform for decades have sought innovate solutions to fix and improve America’s 
urban schools.  Large percentages of minority and low socioeconomic students in these settings 
are behind their suburban counterparts and often lack the same educational opportunity.  It is 
believed that schools shall look at improving the source that has the largest impact on students, 
teachers.  Recently, policy debate has played a large role in influencing teacher behavior.   
 Success of teachers in urban settings is defined through their organization’s purpose of 
catching their already academically and socially behind students up to the success level of 
suburban students.  This entails teachers finding motivation to go above and beyond their basic 
call of duty, the contractual agreement.  However, to sustain teacher motivation it must be 
discretionary and voluntary.  The simplest definition of this behavior is doing the right thing that 
benefits the greater good of an organization without receiving personal recognition or merit.  
Organ (1990), and later in education DiPaola (2007), defined this as organizational citizenship 
behavior. 
 Within the higher bureaucratic system, the policy debate has experimented using control 
theory in schools to motivate teachers to demonstrate OCB.  This study expands the policy 
debate to determine whether monetary or community rewards, Ouchi’s market and clan, 
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typology, better motivate teacher acts of citizenship behavior.  Community motivation stems 
from individual commitment to the school’s and community’s goals. Conversely to this debate is 
that teachers are motivated through monetary rewards of predetermined requirements.  The 
manifestation of community, or clan control, in schools are professional learning communities, 
whereas the manifestation of market control is merit pay. This study answers the research 
question, Does the market or clan control configuration best motivate teachers to demonstrate 
organizational citizenship behavior?  
5.2 Review of Constructs 
The researcher found four districts to participate in the study, two of which were 
eventually omitted. Each of the remaining districts in this small scale study represented one of 
the control configurations.  The pay-for-performance district was rewarded a federal PIONEER 
grant that utilized a formula to rank their highest need schools. The formula defined at-risk 
schools as high percentage poverty, MAP scores, school size and percent of ELL students. This 
district had 146 teachers participate in the survey.  The grant defined six areas teachers could 
make bonuses, totaling up to ten thousand dollars per teacher.  This district’s motivation 
technique was individualized per teacher and not structured in a manner that pitted teachers 
against each other competitively.   
The professional learning community district implemented the collaboration tool 
voluntarily.   This setting provided regularly scheduled times for staff members to collaborate 
over student behavior, data, upcoming lessons and objectives, hold group meetings with parents 
or guardians, and discuss school goals.  Also included in collaboration are administrators and 
counselors.  These PLCs now influence the school’s operations, dictate the master calendar, 
teacher plan periods and professional development. Motivation in this district is collective. 
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5.3 Review of Research Methods 
 A short voluntary survey was disseminated electronically to all teachers within 
participating districts through SurveyMonkey.  After the brief general information section, 
teachers responded to five-point Likert scale questions on the two constructs of OCB and PLC.  
The twenty-two OCB questions stemmed from previously used surveys that incorporated the five 
behaviors of OCB - altruism, conscientiousness, sportsmanship, civic virtue, and courtesy.  The 
fifteen PLC questions stemmed from previously developed surveys on the concept.  All of the 
questions analyzed the perception of teachers on their colleagues to perform citizenship behavior 
and work collaboratively among colleagues. The survey assessed the independent variable, 
teacher motivation, to perform organizational citizenship behavior, the dependent variable. 
5.4 Limitations and Future Direction  
 The limitations of this study surrounded the participation of districts.  Two of the four 
surveyed districts were omitted because only one school within their system agreed to participate 
in the study. Furthermore, twenty-two or less participants in these omitted districts submitted 
responses.  The professional learning community district consisted of four elementary schools, 
culminating in 77 submitted surveys.  This sample size was my comparison group to the pay-for-
performance district of 146 total participants from ten buildings.  The study surveyed all of the 
participating PIONEER program schools within the market control district, which consisted 
mostly of elementary settings but had a few middle school teacher participants. It would be 
preferred to have a comparison of market versus clan of the same grade levels and a similar 
number of participants.  
 Another limitation was the minority population comparison between the two constructs.  
While both districts represented urban settings as defined by Bryk et al. (2010) of high 
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percentage minority and low income, there remained differences in the makeup of the student 
populations.  The clan district was fifty-five percent white compared to nine percent of the 
market district. Moreover, fifteen versus sixty-seven percent, respectively, of the black 
population of the districts.   
Participants of the study were identified through their district code and not by their 
specific school of employment. It would have been beneficial to breakdown the data by each 
school and analyze the sub-dimensions of each district in responses to citizenship behavior and 
PLC implementation. This study would also have liked to understand the background of 
participating teachers and reasoning behind their commitment to urban settings. Dan Lortie 
(2002) in his book Schoolteacher, discusses motivators of becoming a teacher and reasoning 
behind remaining in the profession.  Connecting Lortie’s (2002) theory to teacher citizenship 
behavior is a potential future direction. 
 A future study could explore Lortie’s (2002) theory and understand how it influences 
teacher motivation to perform citizenship behavior.  Furthermore, a study could assess the 
upbringing of current teacher participants to compare with their current student upbringings.   
This could be done through a qualitative study by interviewing participants of this current study.  
This study analyzed district level control configurations.  A study could look whether building 
level control configurations have similar results as district controls as perhaps, teachers work for 
their direct report differently than the bureaucratic system they are employed under. Another 
future direction would be to explore the interaction that the clan construct is having with the 
other controls of this study, resulting in higher OCB levels.  This study demonstrated a larger 
increase in teacher citizenship behavior when experience was added to the model than any other 
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control. This should be explored to understand this relationship better and the influence that 
experience has on OCB. 
5.5 Findings and Implications  
The findings of this study could have heavy future implications on how districts and 
schools operate. Ultimately, the findings herein are uniquely counterintuitive to mainstream 
business operations where monetary rewards are the fundamental motivational factor behind 
one’s behavior.  The argument presented here is that teachers are motivated to go above and 
beyond their contractual agreement through group norms and corporation, which are inherently 
tied back to their principal calling into the profession of improving student outcomes, whether 
that be individually defined as behavioral or academic results.    
Currently there is a governing policy debate of how to motivate teachers.  One argument 
is that schools operate similarly to mainstream businesses.  Within this structure, teachers are 
rewarded through monetary incentives to reach performance criteria.  Their motivation stems 
from the recognition of bonuses.  For example, a car salesperson has an annual guaranteed base 
salary plus a financial reward each time they sell a vehicle.  This salesperson would then define 
his or her motivation to sell the amount of cars needed to meet their individual financial goals, or 
their predetermined desired bonus amount.  In the school monetary reward argument, teachers 
are motivated by their predetermined desired bonus amount as well.  Here they would receive 
bonuses that are tied with their professional behavior, such as doing more professional 
development hours or having higher attendance rates.  The essential finding of this study argues 
that teachers are not motivated similarly to mainstream business structures, like a car salesman.   
Rather, teachers are motivated through the other side of the policy debate, which 
ultimately is the argument presented in this study.   Teachers are motivated to do more than their 
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contractual agreement through collaborative settings that are grounded in collective goals and 
objectives.  This is consistent with the reasoning teachers enter the profession in the first place. 
Teachers are inherently altruistic because often their motivation in becoming an educator is to 
make a difference in the lives of students.  This study defined urban settings behind their 
suburban counterparts because of the complexity of the competing needs of their student makeup 
of low socioeconomic and minority populations.  In order to catch these academically and 
behaviorally behind students up, the schools must operate as a cohesive system with common 
goals.  These goals outline the roadmap of the normative control structures that become apparent 
in collaborative settings, where teachers are motivated through common fundamental beliefs and 
norms.  Therefore, the principal finding of this study is that the typology Ouchi originally 
defined as clan control motivates teachers to go above their contractual agreement more than 
market control.  More simply put, professional learning communities produce more altruism, or 
more dedication of their teachers, to go above and beyond the normal call of duty than pay-for-
performance structures.  
The results of this study confirmed its original hypothesis that teachers are motivated to 
perform OCB more through clan control.  This rejects the null hypothesis that there is no 
relationship between control configurations and teacher OCB.  Through a linear regression 
model, professional learning communities had a statistically significant impact on teacher OCB 
of .251, defined through teacher perceptions of their colleagues.  As eight controls were added to 
the regression model, the impact PLCs had on citizenship behavior continued to increase.  The 
only control that had a no impact of PLCs on OCB was gender.  These findings could have the 
following implications on future policy and practice decisions.   
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As federal, state and local funding continue to decrease, which encourages districts to 
become innovative with revenue, these findings demonstrate the importance of where district 
monies should be spent. Rather than paying bonuses to teachers for summative evaluations and 
student outcomes, districts would see a greater impact on student performances through a 
commitment of building a collaborative community.  This community practice would impact the 
policy debate of school and teacher evaluations.  Currently, the federal government is pushing 
hard to incorporate student assessment data to be included in teacher evaluations. This study 
would argue that teachers should be evaluated on their level of collaboration in helping their 
community reach goals, which ultimately would impact student assessment scores as they would 
get a greater dedication from their teachers. Moreover, these implications could then effect 
school accreditation and teacher certification. 
In terms of practical implications, this study could influence how districts allocate time 
and resources towards teacher professional development. These results suggests professional 
development should focus on developing common goals that the community of the school can 
support.  Prior to effecting the development of teachers, districts should stress the importance of 
collaboration through their recruitment and hiring processes. Questions should determine the 
level of commitment to larger community goals versus individual rewards. These findings also 
suggest that the relationship between supervisor and subordinate would change. Perhaps 
supervisors would focus energy on facilitating the evaluation process, contrasting current 
practices of a top-down evaluation process that assess teacher objectives.  The collaborative 
process during evaluations would take more time from both parties, which would need to be built 
into the master calendar and structure of teacher plan time.  Furthermore, these findings would 
suggest districts need to assess their negotiated teacher agreement.  At the core or this study, we 
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assessed the motivation of teachers to go beyond the contractual agreement. Understanding 
teacher motivation to exhibit citizenship behavior, districts could influence their negotiated 
agreement by providing more autonomy in community goal setting and evaluation processes. 
Therefore, within this study’s findings and potential future implications, it is concluded 
that urban districts desiring to motivate teachers to go above their contractual agreement should 
implement clan control by providing a sense of community and common goals.  They should 
incorporate regular collaboration time amongst colleagues that focus on student behavior, data, a 
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